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Examining the Public Use Doctrine and Whether
Expanding a Private University is a Public Use
I. INTRODUCTION
No court has ever stated whether expanding a private university is
a public use pursuant to the Takings Clause. Recently, however, a
New York court indicated a reluctance to label a private university as
a public use by holding that unless the legislature specifically gives
eminent domain power to the private university, expanding a private
university is not a valid public use under state law.
In Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 1 Columbia
University, in conjunction with the New York City Economic
Development Corporation, tried to acquire “17 acres in the
Manhattanville area of West Harlem for the development of a new
campus for Columbia University.” 2 The court reasoned that because
Columbia University did not possess eminent domain power, the
university was not a public use and, thus, the taking violated the New
York Constitution. 3 The court also relied on Kelo v. City of New
London 4 and held that the taking violated the U.S. Constitution
because the taking improperly favored Columbia University. 5
Although the court’s reluctance to label the expansion of a private
university as a public use is flawed, Kaur illustrates how Kelo can
actually restrain the government’s eminent domain power 6 despite the
1. 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 15 N.Y.3d 253 (N.Y. 2010).
2. Id. at 11.
3. Id. at 25 (reasoning that if the court were to grant Columbia University “civic purpose
status,” the court would be “doing that which the Legislature has explicitly failed to do”).
4. 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see infra Part II.A.3.
5. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 18. (“[T]he issue of improper motive in transfers to private
parties with only discrete secondary benefits to the public . . . is precisely the issue presented by
[this] case.”).
6. Although New York’s high court reversed Kaur in Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev.
Corp., 15 N.Y.3d 235 (N.Y. 2010), Kaur still stands as an example of how other state and
federal courts may use Kelo to limit the government’s eminent domain power. The New York
Court of Appeals reversed the intermediate court’s ruling based on New York law, id. passim,
and subsequently did not mention Kelo or the language in Kelo concerning the importance of a
carefully considered development plan. See infra notes 59íDQGDFFRPSDQ\LQJWH[W7KH1HZ
York Court of Appeals held that, in New York, determining blight or public use are absolutely
the province of the legislature, not the judiciary. Id. at 253. Thus, it was improper for the
intermediate court to perform a de novo review of the record, conclude that there was possible
bad faith in Columbia University’s favor, and conclude that the blight studies were not
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popular belief that Kelo eviscerates the public use requirement.7 The
court misinterpreted case law that, when analyzed more thoroughly,
shows that possessing eminent domain power is not determinative in
labeling the private university as a public use. A more logical ruling
would have been education is a public use, and that if the legislature
has shown that private universities are part of this public use, then it
is acceptable to use eminent domain to expand a private university.
This article emphasizes that expanding a private university can be
a public use, while also highlighting Kaur’s example of how Kelo can
restrain the government’s eminent domain power. This article also
presents two options for improving current eminent domain law. Part
II discusses eminent domain law and Kelo. Part III describes the facts
and holdings in Kaur. Part IV shows the method of analysis
established by case law. Part IV also references the Appendix, which
provides examples of state laws that are relevant to determining if a
private university is a public use. Part V discusses Kaur’s example of
how Kelo can restrain eminent domain and provides a couple options
for improving current eminent domain law.
II. UNDERSTANDING EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain is “[t]he right which belongs to the society, or to
the sovereign, of disposing, in case of necessity, and for the public
safety, of all the wealth contained in the state.” 8 “American
governmental entities at all levels possess some form of eminent
domain power—the power to take private property interests.”9

independent.
7. In Kelo, the majority opinion gave the “legislatures broad latitude in determining what
public needs justify the use of the takings power,” 545 U.S. at 483, despite the dissenting
justice’s fear that this broad deference standard would remove virtually all restraint on using
eminent domain. Id. at 494–98 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See Marci A. Hamilton, Political
Responses to Supreme Court Decisions, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 119–21 (2009); see
infra note 156 and accompanying text.
8. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223 (1845). A taking occurs when a government
action substantially deprives an owner of the use and enjoyment of their property. See Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding that permanent
physical occupation is a per se taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 123–28 (1978) (showing that a taking may occur when there is a total deprivation in
property value); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922) (stating that if the
government regulation goes too far, it is a taking).
9. David A. Thomas, Why the Public Plundering of Private Property Rights is Still a
Very Bad Idea, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 25, 60 (2006).
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A. Interpreting the Public Use Requirement
The Fifth Amendment states, “No person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 10
However, the meaning of “public use” has been debated throughout
history: 11 courts have wavered between defining public use broadly to
mean anything that is a “public advantage, public utility, or public
purpose,” to defining it narrowly to mean “used by the public.” 12
Currently, however, three Supreme Court cases, Berman v. Parker, 13
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 14 and Kelo v. City of New
London, 15 interpret public use broadly.

1. Berman v. Parker
In Berman, property owners challenged the constitutionality of the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.16 At the time, the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act stated that
substandard housing and blighted areas . . . are injurious to the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare; and it is hereby declared
to be the policy of the United States to protect and promote the
welfare of the inhabitants of the seat of the Government by
eliminating all such injurious conditions by employing all means
17
necessary and appropriate for the purpose.

Pursuant to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, the local
planning commission prepared a comprehensive plan involving an area
in Southwest Washington D.C. called Project Area B. 18 This plan
allocated Project Area B for various purposes including low-income
dwelling units. 19
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
11. David Schultz, What’s Yours Can Be Mine: Are There Any Private Takings After
Kelo v. City of New London?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 195, 197–200 (2006).
12. Id. at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
14. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
15. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
16. 348 U.S. at 28–31.
17. Id. at 28 (citing District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, 60 Stat. 790 (1951)
(codified as amended at D.C. Code § 6-101.01(a) (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 30–31.
19. Id. Following the plan’s approval, the commission certified the plan to the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency for execution. Id. at 29–31. The District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act created the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency. Id. at 29.
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Property owners who owned a department store located in Project
Area B “object[ed] to the appropriation of [their] property for the
purposes of the project” for two principal reasons. 20 First, the
department store was not a slum, and, thus, it was unconstitutional to
take the property “merely to develop a better balanced, more attractive
community.” 21 Second, the property “will be put into the project
under the management of a private, not a public, agency and
redeveloped for private, not public, use.” 22
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled against the property
owners and held that Congress had the power to determine what
constitutes a public use. 23 The Court reasoned that this power stems
from the police power and that “the legislature, not the judiciary, is
the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social
legislation.” 24 Therefore, “[i]t is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.” 25
This principle holds true even when the legislature decides to use
its eminent domain power: 26 “If those who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well
as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.” 27 In other words, “eminent domain is merely the means to the
end” and it is solely up to Congress to determine the means, whether
public or private, it will use to execute its project “once the public
purpose has been established.”28
Accordingly, Congress not only has the power to use private
enterprise to execute the public use, but Congress also has the
authority to authorize these private entities to “attack the problem of
the blighted parts of the community on an area rather than on a

The agency has the power to “acquire and assemble, by eminent domain and otherwise, real
property for ‘the redevelopment of blighted territory . . . and the prevention, reduction, or
elimination of blighting factors or causes of blight.’” Id.
20. Id. at 31.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 32–33, 36.
24. Id. at 32. The Court also stated, “Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when
the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”

Id.

25. Id. at 33.
26. Id. at 32.
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id.; see Thomas, supra note 10, at 61 (“[Berman]sent a strong signal that the Court
would recognize almost no restrictions on the concept of public use, effectively eviscerating the
phrase as a constitutional restraint on government power over private property.”).
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structure-by-structure basis.” 29 The legislature, or an authorized
private entity, may take private property that is itself “innocuous and
unoffending” 30 if it is “important to redesign the whole area . . . to
eliminate the conditions that cause slums.”31

2. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
In the 1960s, the Hawaii legislature decided that it was
problematic that seventy-two private landowners in Hawaii owned
forty-seven percent of the land in the state.32 To redress this problem,
the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967, which allowed
the Hawaii Housing Authority to condemn and acquire property from
the landowners and then sell the property in fee simple to the
property’s current tenants. 33
In 1978, after the Hawaii Housing Authority held a public hearing
and decided that taking certain property effectuated the Land Reform
Act’s public purpose, 34 the landowners refused to comply with the
order to sell their land. 35 The landowners filed suit, asking the court
to declare the Land Reform Act of 1967 unconstitutional.36
The Court unanimously ruled against the landowners. 37 The Court
relied heavily on Berman and stated, “The ‘public use’ requirement
is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”38
Thus, absent unreasonableness, 39 impossibility,40 or irrationality, 41 the
29. Berman, 348 U.S. at 34.
30. Id. at 35.
31. Id. at 34. The Court specifically mentioned the following slum-causing conditions:
“the overcrowding of dwellings, the lack of parks, the lack of adequate streets and alleys, the
absence of recreational areas, the lack of light and air, [and] the presence of outmoded street
patterns.” Id.
32. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984). The Midkiff Court
explained that this problem arose, in part, because Hawaii’s early settlers developed a feudal
land system where chiefs and certain subchiefs governed the land, but the island’s high chief
controlled and essentially owned all the land. Id.
33. Id. at 233–34.
34. Id. at 234. The Court stated that the Land Reform Act attempted to “reduce the
perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly” because such an oligopoly “created
artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the . . . land market and forced thousands of
individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes.” Id. at 241–
242.
35. Id. at 234–35.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 231–32.
38. Id. at 240.
39. Id. at 241 (citing United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680
(1896)).
40. Id. at 240 (citing Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
41. Id. at 241 (uphold the taking, “where the exercise of the eminent domain power is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”).
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Court “will not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as
to what constitutes a public use,” 42 regardless of whether the Court
thinks the legislative act will actually accomplish its objective.43
The Court did note that courts play a role “in reviewing a
legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use,” 44 but stated
that this role is “extremely narrow.”45 And in cases such as this one,
where there is no purely private taking—a taking to benefit a
particular class of identifiable individuals— 46the court will have no
trouble concluding that the taking is constitutional.47
The Court also clarified its stance on whether taking property for
public use requires use by the general public: “It is not essential that
the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, . . . directly
enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a
public use.” 48 The Court will only scrutinize the taking’s purpose, not
the means to effectuate that purpose under the Takings Clause. 49

3. Kelo v. City of New London
In 1990, a Connecticut state agency labeled New London,
Connecticut a “distressed municipality.” 50 By 1998, a naval center
located in New London had closed, the city’s unemployment rate was
nearly double the state’s unemployment rate, and its population was at
a seventy-eight year low. 51 “These conditions prompted state and local
officials to target New London . . . for economic revitalization.”52 In
January 2000, New London approved a development plan to create
new jobs, increase tax revenue, revitalize the city, create recreational
areas, and capitalize on Pfizer, Inc.’s proposal to build a new facility
in the city. 53 The plan focused on ninety acres “situated on a peninsula
42. Id.
43. Id. at 242–43. The Court stated, “When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of
takings . . . are not to be carried out in the federal courts.” Id.
44. Id. at 240.
45. Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
46. Id. at 245.
47. Id. at 241–42.
48. Id. at 243–44 (alteration in original) (citing Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles Cnty., 262
U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).
49. Id. at 244.
50. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 472, 474–75. In February 1998, Pfizer announced its plan to build a $300
million research facility in New London. The Court stated that New London’s “local planners
hoped that Pfizer would draw new business to the area, thereby serving as a catalyst to the area’s
rejuvenation.” Id. at 473.

169]

PRIVATE UNIVERSITY, PUBLIC USE

175

that juts into the Thames River” and proposed using eminent domain
to acquire the required property from owners that were unwilling to
sell their property. 54
In December 2000, after the New London Development
Corporation 55 initiated condemnation proceedings in accordance with
the city’s plan, several landowners who owned property in the area
filed suit. 56 The landowners claimed that “taking . . . their
properties . . . violate[d] the public use restriction in the Fifth
Amendment.” 57 They argued that taking their property for the sole
purpose of economic development expanded the definition of public
use to the point that the public use requirement became meaningless.58
The Court ruled against the landowners. 59 Justice Stevens wrote
the majority opinion and concluded that “the takings challenged [in
this case] satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth
Amendment.” 60 He reasoned that for over a century, the Court
consistently rejected the narrow interpretation of public use and
“embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as
‘public purpose.’” 61 The Court’s “jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed . . . intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify” a public use.62
Thus, because the legislature rationally 63 determined that New London
“was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic

54. Id. at 472, 474. The city divided the plan into seven parcels for uses including a
waterfront conference hotel, shopping center, marinas, a river walk, new homes, a U.S. Coast
Guard Museum, a state park, office space, and parking. Id. at 474.
55. The New London Development Corporation was a private, nonprofit entity established
to assist New London in economic development. Id. at 473.
56. Id. at 475. In all, there were nine petitioners that owned fifteen properties within the
redevelopment area. Id.
57. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Brief of Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108),
2004 WL 2811059, *14.
59. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Connecticut, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 1659558, at
*21, stated that “most of the other cases involved condemnations pursuant to blight
determinations and thus have not presented this Court with an opportunity to address eminent
domain for the sole purpose of economic development.” Further, “this case presents a vital
constitutional question that this Court has never before addressed: whether the public use clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution authorizes the exercise of eminent domain to
help a government increase its tax revenue and to create jobs.” Id. at *6.
60. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
61. Id. at 480.
62. Id. at 483.
63. While Justice Stevens did not explicitly say New London’s plan was rational, he
implied that the plan was rational “[g]iven the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough
deliberation that preceded [the plan’s] adoption,” and the nexus between the plan’s purpose and
city’s distressed circumstance. Id. at 483–84.
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rejuvenation,” 64 the legislature’s determination that public purpose
justifies this taking was entitled to deference. 65
Justice Stevens also argued that this taking was not a purely
private taking 66 because New London executed a “‘carefully
considered’ development plan” with “no evidence of an illegitimate
purpose.” 67 He acknowledged that interpreting public use to include
economic redevelopment may allow the government to transfer
“citizen A’s property to citizen B for the sole reason that citizen B
will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay more
taxes.” 68 He noted, however, that this is not such a case and that
worrying about a hypothetical “parade of horribles” is not sufficient to
override a valid taking. 69
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion and emphasized that
courts should apply a rational-basis review when reviewing a
legislature’s determination that a taking satisfies the public-use
requirement. 70 He also added that courts applying rational-basis review
should strike down takings that “favor a particular party.”71 Possible
indications of this impermissible favoritism include when there is no
remedial comprehensive plan, when the benefits of the plan are trivial,
when the government can identify each private beneficiary at the time
it formulates the plan, and when the government fails to review a

64. Id. at 483.
65. Id. at 483. Perhaps anticipating public outrage over the Kelo decision, Justice Stevens
qualified his three arguments by explaining that whether economic development satisfies the
public use requirement is a legitimate matter for public debate. Id. at 489–90.
66. Id. at 477. The Midkiff Court stated, “A purely private taking could not withstand the
scrutiny of the public use requirement” and that the Act in question did not “benefit a particular
class of identifiable individuals.” Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
67. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536
(Conn. 2004)). Justice Stevens pointed out that the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that New
London’s development plan “was not intended to serve the interests of Pfizer, Inc., or any other
private entity, but rather to revitalize the local economy.” Id. at n.6 (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d at
595).
68. Id. at 486–87.
69. Id. at 486–87 & n.19. Justice Stevens stated that such a taking might “raise a
suspicion that a private purpose was afoot” and if the taking is “executed outside the confines of
an integrated development plan,” the taking may violate the Constitution. Id. at 487.
70. Id. at 490–91. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy:
Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 118–19 (2006)
(citing Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491) (reasoning that
“Justice Kennedy . . . expresses confidence that rational basis style review in the context of
eminent domain will succeed where other instances of rational basis review have often failed.”
Further, “it will provide courts with an effective tool . . . to stop government actions intended to
‘favor a particular . . . party’”).
71. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491–93 (“A court confronted with a plausible accusation of
impermissible favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one and review
the record to see if it has merit . . . .”). Id. at 491.
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variety of alternative plans or developers.72
Both Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas wrote dissenting
opinions. 73 Justice O’Connor believed that the majority’s errors
stemmed from errant dictum in Berman and Midkiff 74 and that
permitting economic development takings will cause a slippery slope,
making “all private property . . . vulnerable to being taken and
transferred to another private owner.”75 She argued that a taking is an
invalid, purely private taking if the targeted property does not inflict
an affirmative harm on society and if the taking of the property does
not directly achieve a public benefit.76
Justice Thomas concluded that the majority’s decision was “simply
the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to
be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original
meaning.” 77 He reasoned that the public-use requirement’s “most
natural reading . . . allows the government to take property only if the
government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the
72. Id. at 491–92.
73. Id. at 494, 505.
74. Id. at 498, 501–02 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor explained that the
language in Berman and Midkiff equating public use with the police power was dictum and stated
that Kelo “demonstrates why, when deciding if a taking’s purpose is constitutional, the police
power and public use cannot always be equated.” Id. at 501–02 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
75. Id. at 494. Justice O’Connor illustrates her fear by citing to a dissent in Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464 (Mich. 1981), which states that by
allowing economic development takings, “no homeowner’s, merchant’s or manufacturer’s
property, however productive or valuable to its owner, is immune from condemnation for the
benefit of other private interests that will put it to a ‘higher’ use.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505.
Further, “The trouble with economic development takings is that private benefit and incidental
public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing.” Id. at 502. Justice O’Connor
also believes that people who will benefit from economic development takings will most likely be
“those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large
corporations and development firms.” Id. at 505.
76. Id. at 500. Justice O’Connor distinguishes this case from Berman and Midkiff by
stating that in those cases the “targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society” and that
the “taking directly achieved a public benefit.” Id.; see also Mahoney, supra note 71, at 121–22
(referring to this line of reasoning by Justice O’Connor as the “harm/benefit framework”).
77. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas reasons that “two misguided lines
of precedent,” obscured the natural meaning of public use and subsequently misled the Court in
Berman and Midkiff. Id. at 514–20. In Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, the Court declared
that irrigation was a matter of public interest, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896); however, Justice
Thomas argues that the statement equating public interest with public use in Bradley was dictum
and did not mean public interest equals public use. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 515. Instead, Bradley
should be understood to show that because the surrounding landowners had the right to use the
water, irrigation is a public use. Id. at 515–16. Second, in United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry.
Co., where Congress wanted to take land to build Gettysburg battlefield memorials, the Court
stated that “when the legislature has declared the use . . . to be a public one, its judgment will
be respected by the courts.” 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896). Justice Thomas also argues that this
statement was dictum because when a government takes property for its own use and ownership,
it is absolutely a public use; therefore, any legislative declaration that the Gettysburg memorials
are in the public interest was irrelevant to the Court’s decision. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 517.
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property.” 78

B. Eminent Domain Law in New York
In 1968, the New York legislature passed the Urban Development
Corporation Act 79 (“UDCA”) to eliminate blight, promote economic
growth, and remedy the lack of “educational, recreational, cultural
and other community facilities” in the state. 80 To carry out this
purpose, the UDCA created the Urban Development Corporation, also
known as the Empire State Development Corporation (“ESDC”), and
permitted the ESDC to use eminent domain power if it found that, for
example, the project area consists of a facility suitable for educational
or other civic purposes. 81
In 1975, New York’s highest court adhered to the broad definition
of public use in Yonkers Community Development Agency v.
Morris. 82 When the city of Yonkers decided to take landowners’
78. Id. at 508. For instance, because a founding-era dictionary defined “use” to mean
“employing anything to any purpose” and because the Latin root of “use” means to “make use
of, avail one’s self of, employ, apply, enjoy, etc.,” the Constitution’s Framers must have
intended “public use” to mean that “the government or its citizens . . . must actually employ the
taken property.” Id. at 508–09 (quoting Samuel Johnson, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 2194 (4th ed. 1773)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Thomas also
presented an intra-textual argument by concluding, “Elsewhere, the Constitution twice employs
the word ‘use,’ both times in its narrower sense,” and that the Framers used the term “general
[w]elfare” when they wanted to indicate the broader interpretation. Id. at 509. Justice Thomas
also fears a slippery slope because “[o]nce one permits takings for public purposes in addition to
public uses, no coherent principle limits what could constitute a valid public use.” Id. at 520.
79. N.Y. UNCONSOL. §§ 6251–92 (McKinney 2010).
80. Id. § 6252. The legislature stated that the lack of these facilities “threatens and
adversely affects the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people of the state.” Id. The
legislature further declared the UDCA’s purpose and policy:
It is further declared to be the policy of the state to promote the safety, health, morals
and welfare of the people of the state and to promote the sound growth and
development of our municipalities through the correction of such substandard,
insanitary, blighted, deteriorated or deteriorating conditions, factors and characteristics
by the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, redevelopment, rehabilitation, restoration
or conservation of such areas, and of areas reasonably accessible thereto the
undertaking of public and private improvement programs related thereto, including the
provision of educational, recreational and cultural facilities, and the encouragement of
participation in these programs by private enterprise.
Id.; see Cine 42nd St. Theater Corp. v. Nederlander Org., Inc., 790 F.2d 1032, 1035–36 (2d
Cir. 1986); Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 23 (App. Div. 2009) rev’d,
15 N.Y.3d 253 (N.Y. 2010); Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701
(App. Div. 1985); N.Y. State Mortgage Loan Enforcement & Admin. Corp. v. Coney Island
Site Five Houses, 491 N.Y.S.2d 671, 673 (App. Div. 1985).
81. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. § 6253(6)(d) (McKinney 2010); Cine 42nd St. Theater Corp.,
790 F.2d at 1036; see Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 11. The ESDC must also follow New York’s
Eminent Domain Procedure Law, which ensures that the state pays just compensation, allows for
public participation, encourages settlement, and adheres to the public use requirement. N.Y.
UNCONSOL. § 6263; see generally N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. §§ 101–709 (McKinney 2010).
82. 335 N.E.2d 327, 331 (N.Y. 1975).
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property to remove substandard conditions, the landowners argued that
their property was not substandard and that taking their property was
for a private purpose: expanding Otis Elevator Company’s facilities. 83
The court held that when “land is . . . substandard, its taking for
urban renewal is for a public purpose . . . [and t]he fact that the
vehicle for renewed use of the land . . . be a private agency does
not . . . change the permissible nature of the taking.” 84 In addition, it
does not matter that Otis Elevator Company indicated that it would
“leave Yonkers if suitable land was not found for its . . . expansion”
because urban renewal inherently involves economic and private
benefits and there is nothing wrong with the city and a private party
benefiting from the same taking.85
The court then reasoned that deciding whether urban renewal
qualifies as a public use is primarily a decision for agencies under the
direction of the legislature.86 It is true that courts should “be more
than rubber stamps” in defining a public use, but courts should review
an agency’s “findings only upon a limited basis”: when the agency’s
decision is baseless. 87
III. THE FACTS AND HOLDING IN KAUR V. NEW YORK STATE URBAN

DEVELOPMENT CORP.

In 2001, Columbia University (“Columbia”) began working with
the ESDC and the New York City Economic Development
Corporation (“EDC”) to acquire seventeen acres in West Harlem to
build a new campus. 88 The target property is near the ocean in the
Manhattanville area and consists primarily of auto-related businesses,
“parking lots and partially empty industrial buildings.” 89 In August
2002, the EDC issued a plan to renew and revitalize this waterfront
area to “develop a vibrant commercial and cultural district, and
support academic research.”90
83. Id. at 330.
84. Id. at 331.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 332–33.
87. Id.
88. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11–12 (App. Div. 2009)
rev’d, 15 N.Y.3d 253 (N.Y. 2010). Specifically, Columbia University wanted to build about
sixteen new buildings, totaling about 6.8 million square feet. Id. at 12.
89. Id. The target area “is bounded by and includes West 125th Street on the south, West
133rd Street on the north, Broadway . . . on the east, and Twelfth Avenue on the west.” Id.
There were sixty-seven lots within the target area, and “[a]ccording to data prepared for the Plan
by Ernst & Young, [fifty-four] of the [sixty-seven] lots were in ‘good,’ ‘very good[,]’ or ‘fair’
condition.” Id.
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In 2002, Columbia began buying property in the target area, and
by 2003, Columbia owned fifty-one percent of the property in the
area. 91 In 2004, Columbia, the ESDC, and the EDC discussed using
eminent domain to acquire the rest of the land. Columbia hired the
consulting firm Allee, King, Rosen and Fleming, (“AKRF”) to assist
with the project. 92
Both the EDC and the ESDC prepared a blight study of the area. 93
First, in December 2004, the EDC concluded that the area was a
blight, and then in September 2006, the ESDC asked AKRF to
conduct another blight study. 94 AKRF concluded, “[forty-eight] of the
[sixty-seven] lots in the study area . . . ha[d] one or more substandard
condition[s]” and that the “area was substantially unsafe, unsanitary,
substandard, and deteriorated.” 95
By 2007 Columbia owned seventy-two percent of the property in
the area. 96 The New York City Council approved rezoning the area,
and the relevant state agencies approved the plan to revitalize the
area. 97 However, criticism that AKRF’s blight study was biased
because of AKRF’s association with Columbia98 led to ESDC hiring
another firm, Earth Tech, Inc., to audit and evaluate AKRF’s blight
study. 99 Earth Tech concluded that “certain buildings had further
deteriorated since prior inspections” and that “a majority of the
buildings and lots in the . . . area exhibited substandard and
deteriorated conditions creating a blighted and discouraging impact on
the surrounding community.” 100
In December 2008, the ESDC concluded that the project qualified
as a civic purpose pursuant to the UDCA, 101 and in February 2009,
landowners challenged the taking.102 The landowners argued that
expanding a private university is not a civic purpose under the UCDA
and is not a public purpose under the Takings Clause. 103 The court
held that the taking violated the Takings Clause, that the blight studies
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 12–13.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See supra text accompanying note 92.
99. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 13–14.
100. Id. at 14. (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. The UDCA uses the term “civic
purpose” and Kelo uses the terms “public use” and “public purpose”; however, Kaur regards
these terms as essentially synonymous. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 15–16, 24–25.
102. Id. at 15.
103. Id.
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were flawed, and that Columbia was not a public use.104

A. The Kaur Court Applies Kelo and Holds That This Taking
Violates the Takings Clause
The Kaur court ruled against Columbia, the EDC, and the
ESDC. 105 The court relied on Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo to reason
that the term “public use” in the Takings Clause is broad and that
determining whether a project constitutes a public use is primarily the
legislature’s decision. 106 The court decided, however, that deference to
the ESDC’s determination in this case was not appropriate. Following
the logic of the Yonkers court and because Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Kelo stated that takings involving impermissible
favoritism are subject to increased scrutiny,107 the Kaur court decided
that courts should “be more than rubber stamps” in determining public
use. 108
The court reasoned that Justice Kennedy’s notion of impermissible
favoritism “[was] precisely the issue presented [in this] case”; thus,
the court intensified its review and focused on different factors that
might indicate impermissible favoritism. 109 For instance, in Kelo, New
London was depressed, and subsequently the city decided to act;
however, in this case, the ESDC decided to act in Columbia’s favor
before performing a blight study. 110 Second, in this case, no
government agency committed any public funds to the project. 111
Third, Columbia funded “every document constituting the [ESDC’s]
plan,” including the initial blight studies.112 Finally, the ESDC
considered only one alternative to the revitalization plan and the
ESDC knew Columbia’s identity at the time it contemplated its
plan. 113

104. Id. at 15, 22–23.
105. Id. at 11.
106. Id. at 16–18.
107. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 18–19; see supra Part II.A.3.
108. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 16; see supra Part II.B.
109. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 18. The Kaur court stated that “it was the specific aspects of
the New London planning process that convinced [Justice Kennedy] to side with the plurality in
deference to the legislative determination.” Id.at 19.
110. Id. at 18. The court highlighted that the fact “the only purportedly unbiased or
untainted study that concluded that Manhattanville was blighted . . . was not completed until
2008; the point at which the ESDC/Columbia steamroller had virtually run its course.” Id. at 19.
111. Id. (“Columbia underwrote all of the costs of studying and planning for what would
become a sovereign sponsored campaign of Columbia’s expansion.”).
112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. at 19í
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B. Blight Studies Must be Independent and Free of Underutilization
Analysis
The court scrutinized the ESDC’s blight study and held that blight
studies must be independent, credible, and not account for
underutilization, 114 and the court frowned upon the ESDC’s
commitment to “allow Columbia to annex Manhattanville” 115 before
establishing blight and upon the fact that the ESDC’s second blight
study was merely an evaluation of the first blight study.116
Further, the ESDC’s blight study did not account for the fact that
Columbia owned much of the property in the area. 117 Because the
court found that Columbia wanted to label this area as blighted,
Columbia allowed buildings to remain vacant, water infiltration
problems to go unfixed, and building code violations to continue over
many years. 118 The court stated, “[i]t is apparent from the record that
ESDC had no intention of determining if Manhattanville was blighted
prior to, or apart from, Columbia’s control of the area.” 119
The court also reasoned that the ESDC’s first blight study was
flawed. 120 For instance, the blight study accounted for things like
unpainted walls, loose awning supports, and other safety and zoning
violations, which, the court reasoned, are common characteristics
throughout New York City. 121 And the study did not account for
important factors such as “real estate values, rental demand, and
rezoning applications.” 122
Finally, the court categorically rejected any blight study based
solely on underutilization. 123 The court concluded that basing a blight
study on an area’s underutilization “transforms the purpose of blight
removal from the elimination of harmful . . . conditions . . . to a
policy affirmatively requiring the ultimate . . . development.” 124

114. Id. at 23, 26.
115. Id. at 21.
116. Id. at 20–22; see supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
117. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
118. Id.; but see Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 15 N.Y.3d 253, (N.Y. 2010)
(“Appellate Division disregarded the Urbitran blight study commenced in 2003. . . at a time
when Columbia was only beginning to purchase property in the area.” The Urbitran study found
that “there was ‘ample evidence of deterioration of the building stock in the study area’ and that
‘substandard and unsanitary conditions were detected in the area’”).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 22.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 22–23.
124. Id. at 23.
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C. Expanding a Private University Is Not a Civic Purpose and
Violates the New York Constitution
The court held that expanding a private university is not a civic
purpose under the UCDA for two reasons. First, “Columbia [was]
virtually the sole beneficiary of the Project”; therefore, “the public
benefit [was] incrementally incidental to the private benefits of the
Project” and there was no civic purpose involved. 125 Second,
designating a private university as a public use depends on whether the
legislature grants eminent domain power to the private university. 126
The court relied on University of Southern California, v. Robbins,
where, after the California legislature granted eminent domain power
to tax-exempt educational institutions, a private university wanted to
use eminent domain to acquire the grounds surrounding a library. 127
The California court stated that higher education “is recognized as a
most important public use” and permitted the private university to use
eminent domain.128 The Kaur court reasoned, after discussing
Robbins, “[w]ere we to grant civic purpose status to a private
university for purposes of eminent domain, we [would be] doing that
which the Legislature has explicitly failed to do . . . [and] that
decision is solely the province of the state legislature.”129
IV. EXPANDING A PRIVATE UNIVERSITY MAY BE A PUBLIC USE
The Kaur court reasoned that since Columbia was the sole
beneficiary of the taking and since the legislature has not given
eminent domain power to Columbia, the taking did not serve a public
use. 130 The court, however, ignored and misinterpreted case law that
actually shows that expanding a private university may be a public
use. 131
125. Id. at 24. The court did not explain its conclusion that Columbia was the sole
beneficiary. The court acknowledged a prior case that upheld expanding the New York Stock
Exchange through eminent domain because of the expansion’s public benefits including increased
tax revenue, job opportunities, and enhancing “New York’s prestigious position as a worldwide
financial center,” but the court simply distinguished this case by concluding, “Here, Columbia is
virtually the sole benefit of the Project.” See id. at 24 (citing In re Fisher, 730 N.Y.S.2d 516,
517 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)).
126. Id.
127. 37 P.2d 163, 164–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934), cert. denied 295 U.S. 738 (1935).
128. Id. at 166–67.
129. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 25; but see Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 15 N.Y.3d
253, (N.Y. 2010) (holding that pursuant to state law, the “development of a new Columbia
University campus was supported by a sufficient public use, benefit or purpose”).
130. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
131. The New York Court of Appeals decision that reversed Kaur, Kaur, 15 N.Y.3d 235;
see supra note 6, reversal strengthened this article’s assertion that private universities are a
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First, the court ignored case law that shows that having a sole
private beneficiary should not invalidate a taking. For instance, in
Yonkers, the court upheld a taking based on blight that, not only
benefitted a single private company, but also seemed to be motivated
by the private company’s threat.132 The Yonkers court reasoned,
“[t]he fact that the vehicle for renewed use of the land, once it is
taken, may be a private agency does not in and of itself change the
permissable [sic] nature of the taking.” 133
The court also glazed over another New York case where the
court had upheld an expansion of the New York Stock Exchange
through eminent domain. In In re Fisher, the court held that expanding
the New York Exchange was a public use because the expansion
would provide public benefits including a substantial increase in tax
revenue, job opportunities, and enhancing “New York’s prestigious
position as a worldwide financial center.”134 The Kaur court
acknowledged this case but simply distinguished this case by
concluding, “[h]ere, Columbia is virtually the sole beneficiary of the
Project[,] . . . [and t]his alone is reason to invalidate the
condemnation especially where, as here, the public benefit is
incrementally incidental to the private benefits of the Project.” 135 The
court took no effort to consider that expanding Columbia may offer
the same public benefits that expanding the New York Stock Exchange
would provide(e.g., substantially increasing taxes, jobs, and prestige).
The court then misinterpreted the non-mandatory authority of
Robbins, which the court believed to show that possessing eminent
domain is determinative in deciding if a private university is a public

public use pursuant to the Takings Clause. The New York Court of Appeals, while not
mentioning the California court’s decision in Robbins, see supra notes 127í DQG
accompanying text; see infra notes 136í DQG DFFRPSDQ\LQJ WH[W VLPSO\ KHld that statutory
language does not limit using eminent domain for public educational facilities; in fact, the
statutes encourage participation by private entities. Kaur, 15 N.Y.3d at 258. “Thus, there is no
reason to depart from the plain meaning of the word ‘education’ by limiting the term to public
institutions.” Id.; see infra notes 144íDQGDFFRPSDQying text.
132. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 331–33 (N.Y. 1975); see
supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. The Kaur court did cite to Yonkers to show that
courts should “‘be more than rubber stamps’” in determining whether a project is a public use,
Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (quoting Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at 333), but the court ignored the
complete reasoning in Yonkers. Along with the reasoning that courts should be more than rubber
stamps, the Yonkers court reasoned that determining what qualifies as a blight is “vested in the
agencies and the municipalities” and that “courts may review their findings only upon a limited
basis.” Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at 332. The Yonkers court then concluded its reasoning by
showing that if the government presents an adequate basis for its public use determination, courts
should permit the taking. Id. at 333–34.
133. Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
134. In re Fisher, 730 N.Y.S.2d 516, 517 (App. Div. 2001).
135. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
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use. 136 Robbins, however, shows that education is a public use.137 If
the legislature, which is entitled to deference in determining a public
use, “has enacted . . . laws appropriately designed to make effectual
th[e] ideal” that higher education through private means is a public
use, then courts should permit the taking. 138 Granting eminent domain
power was, in Robbins, just one way the California legislature could
effectuate the ideal that a private university constitutes a public use;
thus, the Kaur court misinterpreted Robbins when it determined that
absent an explicit grant of eminent domain power, Columbia is not a
public use.
The Kaur court also attempted to use another New York case,

Board of Education, Union Free School District No. 2 v. Pace
College, to show that having eminent domain power is determinative

of the legislature’s belief of whether a private university is a public
use. 139 However, Pace had nothing to do with this contention. In Pace,
a school board wanted to condemn and take a private college’s land.140
The private college, which did not have eminent domain power, relied
on the doctrine of prior public use and claimed that public-use lands
are immune from eminent domain unless the condemnor is the state
itself. 141 The court, however, held that the doctrine of prior public use
only applies when “a property owner . . . has been granted a power to
condemn equivalent to that of the petitioning condemnor”; thus, the
fact that the legislature did not give eminent domain power to the
private college means the private college did not have power
equivalent to the condemnor.142 Therefore, though the court in Pace
held that possessing eminent domain power may be important in
applying the doctrine of prior public use, the Pace court’s holding had
nothing to do with whether possessing eminent domain is
136. Univ. of S. Cal. v. Robbins, 37 P.2d 163, 165 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
137. The court stated that, “[t]he framers of our State Constitution gave recognition to the
high importance of education,” and then quoted California’s Constitution: “[a] general diffusion
of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of [education].” Id.
(quoting CAL. CONST. art 9, § 1).
138. Id. The court also stated this in another way: Granting eminent domain power to the
private university was simply the procedure the legislature used in this case to show the
university was a public use. Id. Thus, when a court considers that the legislature bears the
burden of determining “whether or not the purpose served is a public purpose,” courts should
consider whether “the procedure which has been followed . . . by the [l]egislature . . . is in
conformity with the purpose declared by the [c]onstitution and the object which it sought to
attain.” Id.
139. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 24–25.
140. Bd. of Educ. of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Pace Coll., 276 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163–
64 (App. Div. 1966).
141. Id. at 164.
142. Id. at 164, 166.
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determinative of the legislature’s belief that a private university
constitutes a public use. If anything, Pace is only relevant because the
court stated in dicta that private colleges serve an important public
purpose. 143
Because the Kaur court wrongly reasoned that possessing eminent
domain power was the only way to show whether a private university
was a public use, 144 the court did not consider other ways the New
York Legislature could effectuate the ideal that a private university is
a public use. For instance, New York’s UDCA clearly states that the
legislature wants to promote the welfare of the people and sound
growth of municipalities by clearing or redeveloping both blighted
areas and areas reasonably accessible to “public and private
improvement
programs . . .
including
the
provision
of
educational . . . facilities, and the encouragement of participation in
these programs by private enterprise.” 145 This is because the
legislature believes “there is a serious need throughout the state for
adequate educational . . . facilities, the lack of which threatens and
adversely affects the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
people.” 146 The UDCA also explicitly permits takings for civic
projects, which it defines as projects “designed and intended for the
purpose of providing facilities for educational . . . or other civic
purposes.” 147
Therefore, the UDCA provides a clear example of a law that is
“appropriately designed to make effectual th[e] ideal” that education,
even through private enterprise, is a public use. 148 The Kaur court
should have reasoned, similarly to the court in Robbins, that education
is a public use, and that, as evidenced by the UDCA (or some other
appropriate means), the legislature has effectuated a belief that private
universities are part of this public use. Thus, the court should have
held that expanding Columbia is a public use. The Appendix provides
examples of other state laws that could effectuate the ideal that a
private university is a public use.

143. Id. at 166–67.
144. Under Robbins, a court must look for any appropriately designed law that shows that
the legislature believes education through private means is a public use. Univ. of S. Cal. v.
Robbins, 37 P.2d 163, 165 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935); see supra notes 136–37 and
accompanying text.
145. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6252 (McKinney 2010); see supra notes 79–81 and
accompanying text.
146. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6252.
147. See id. §§ 6252, 6253(6)(d).
148. Robbins, 37 P.2d at 165.
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V. AS DEMONSTRATED BY KAUR, THE MAJORITY OPINION IN KELO
CAN RESTRAIN THE GOVERNMENT’S EMINENT DOMAIN POWER
When the Kaur court applied Kelo to reach its holding that using
eminent domain to expand Columbia violated the Takings Clause, the
court demonstrated that Kelo can be a meaningful restraint on eminent
domain power and that Kelo’s majority approach provides some
advantages over the dissents’ approaches. 149 Although the Kelo’s
majority seems to advocate a simple rational basis review, the court
reasoned that suspicion of impermissible favoritism150 requires courts
to intensify its scrutiny.151 Kaur’s example 152 of this ability to apply a
“rational basis plus” 153 review standard contradicts the popular belief
that Kelo “eviscerates” the public use requirement and permits any
taking, any time. 154
The majority opinion, however, is not perfect. Because the
majority opinion advocates evaluating takings on a case-by-case basis
without a bright-line rule, different courts may interpret the opinion
differently, providing less predictability. To remedy this, state and
local governments should consider enacting compensation and
necessity standards.

149. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). To hold the taking
unconstitutional, the Kaur court focused heavily on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion;
however, the court probably could have reached the same result by focusing on Justice Stevens’s
reasoning that a private taking executed outside of a “carefully considered,” “comprehensive,”
and “integrated” development plan may “raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot.” Id.
at 477–78, 484, 487; see supra note 66–67 and accompanying text.
150. Although Justice Kennedy used the term “impermissible favoritism” in his concurring
opinion, the majority opinion stated that a purely private taking, or a taking to benefit
identifiable individuals, is void. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
151. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491í
152. See supra notes 105–13 and accompanying text.
153. See Christopher S. Elmendorf , Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 332 n.66 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
154. See generally Thomas, supra note 19, at 62–63; Kristi M. Burkard, No More

Government Theft of Property! A Call to Return to a Heightened Standard of Review After the
United States Supreme Court Decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL’Y 115, 115–43 (2005); Hamilton, supra note 7, at 121; Gideon Kanner, The Public Use
Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff”?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 335, 335–38 (2006);
Sonya D. Jones, Note, That Land is Your Land, This Land is My Land . . . Until the Local
Government Can Turn It for a Profit: A Critical Analysis of Kelo v. City of New London, 20
BYU J. PUB. L. 139, 139–40, 148–57 (2005).
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A. The Disadvantages of Applying the Alternative Approaches Laid
out in Kelo, and the Advantages of Applying the Kelo Majority’s
Approach
Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinions in

Kelo express the fear that the majority opinion will “victimize the

weak” 155 and open the eminent-domain floodgates, allowing all
property to be taken “so long as it might be upgraded.” 156 Justice
O’Connor agrees with the majority that the term “public use” is broad
and that it is important to defer to “legislative judgments about public
purpose,” but argues that unless there is a direct harm and direct
benefit associated with the taking, the taking violates the public use
requirement. 157 However, this direct harm, direct benefit test is
unclear. It seems possible that if property taking, which is by itself
both innocent and unoffending, to end broad social problems, such as
blight or a land oligopoly, 158 qualifies as a direct harm under this test,
then different courts may hold that almost any conceived social harm
satisfies the test. Abiding by this broad test may create a situation
where any taking is permissible so long as the government can
successfully argue that the taking does not fall into an enumerated
exception, 159 such as takings for purely economic development.
This especially may become a problem if a court compares this
test to some historically acceptable takings. For example, Justice
Stevens and Justice Thomas, who were on opposite sides in the
Court’s ruling in Kelo, cited the early Mill Acts as an example of a
traditional use of eminent domain. 160 These Mills Acts authorized mill
owners to flood upstream land even though the flooded land was not a
direct harm on society.161 Thus, if a court attempts to justify these
historically acceptable takings in light of Justice O’Connor’s test, a
court may reason that the harm required by Justice O’Connor’s test
includes stifled community growth or any other far-reaching social
harm.
Justice Thomas argued that the Court should re-think how it
interprets public use; he argued that interpreting public use narrowly
155. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 499–500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see supra notes 74–76 and accompanying
text.
158. Id. at 500.
159. While Justice O’Connor probably would not extend her test this far, her test is unclear
and different courts may interpret her test in different ways.
160. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 n.8 (majority opinion); Id. at 512 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (the Mill Acts “authorized the owners of grist mills . . .
to flood upstream lands”).
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“embodie[s] the Framers’ understanding.”162 But this assertion fails to
restrain eminent domain power and fails to protect the weak or the
“poor.” 163 While Justice Thomas states that the public use
requirement’s “most natural reading . . . allows the government to
take property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal
right to use, the property,”164 this requirement does not protect the
weak or the poor, it simply limits a few ways in which the
government can use the land after the taking; nothing differentiates
taking property in poor communities from taking property in more
politically affluent communities.
Applying Justice Thomas’s interpretation of public use also
inevitably creates either an over-inclusive or an under-inclusive
problem. 165 Narrowly defining public use may create an over-inclusive
problem, because it may prohibit extremely important takings merely
because the taking would result in private ownership; it would not
matter how much society could benefit from the taking or how
strongly the legislature feels the taking is necessary. In the end, if it is
not efficient or realistic for the government to retain title, or for the
public to have a legal right to use the property, society will not get the
benefit of the taking.
On the other hand, applying Justice Thomas’s test may create an
under-inclusive problem because different courts may define
government ownership differently and broadly. “Government owns”
could mean that the government must own and occupy the property or
that a private party could use the property temporarily as long as the
government retained title. Additionally, Justice Thomas’s requirement
162. Id. at 509–10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although analyzing the truth of the different
opinions in Kelo is beyond the scope of this Article, it seems appropriate to note that history can
be interpreted in a number of different ways. For a historical perspective on interpreting public
use different from Justice Thomas’s view, see Schultz, supra note 11, at 197–209. It seems
probable that nothing is necessarily wrong with Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion, or with any
of the other opinions in Kelo; instead, the Public Use Doctrine’s hazy history makes modern
eminent domain law—or each of the four opinions in Kelo—simply victims of ambiguity. See
generally Shaun A. Goho, Process-Oriented Review and the Original Understanding of the Public
Use Requirement, 38 SW. U. L. REV. 37, 87 (2008) (concluding that “[a]n examination of the
original understanding of the public use requirement reveals that it provides no support for the
narrow ‘use by the public’ test . . . [and that] it also does not support the notion that legislatures
should have unlimited discretion in deciding on the reasons to use eminent domain”).
163. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521–22. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argues that the
majority opinion will encourage the rich and affluent to “victimize the weak” and will exacerbate
the lop-sided effects eminent domain has on minorities and poor communities. Id. at 522
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165. See John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
783, 797 (2006) (stating that the approach is “overinclusive because they would prohibit the
taking of any property through eminent domain for private redevelopment” and “underinclusive
because they would leave [property] vulnerable to eminent domain for most . . . purposes”).
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permits takings if the public has the legal right to use the property, not
just if the government owns the property. It is possible that courts
could also interpret “legal right to use” broadly, allowing the
government to take any property and transfer it to any private owner
on the condition that, at least to some degree, it remains open to the
public. To illustrate, nothing in Justice Thomas’s opinion would stop
New York City from taking property for “Negro removal”166 to create
Central Park because the government owns the park, 167 and nothing
would stop the City of Detroit from uprooting an entire neighborhood
to make room for a Cadillac-manufacturing plant, so long as the
government required General Motors to provide public tours. 168
The majority opinion, alternatively, provides significant
advantages over Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Thomas’s approaches.
The majority opinion advocates for a broad definition of public use,
refuses to distinguish prior precedent, 169 and focuses on “whether the
record demonstrates a public purpose for the taking.” 170 And while
focusing on the inspiration behind the taking may be questionable 171
and may fail to provide a predictable eminent domain rule, the
majority’s approach provides an effective tool for prohibiting
questionable takings because a court can focus on the government’s
actions leading up to the taking, instead of just focusing on the
taking’s end result.
Kaur, and other post-Kelo decisions, provide examples of how
courts can use the majority opinion to restrain the government’s
eminent domain power. In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.
Valsamaki, the city established a renewal plan to eliminate blight, and
as part of the plan, the city attempted to take a three-story commercial
building. 172 The building’s owner challenged the taking and the court

166. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (quoting Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of
Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1,
47 (2003)).
167. See
Full
Text
of
the
Plaque
Commemorating
Seneca
Village,
http://www.centralparknyc.org/visit/things-to-see/great-lawn/seneca-village-site.html.
168. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004); see also Kelo, 545
U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
169. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. The majority opinion seems to be the only
opinion that adheres to “over a century of . . . case law,” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490, because both
Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas state that the majority came to its decision after being
misled by “errant language,” id. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), and “misguided lines of
precedent,” id. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 174 (D.C. 2007).
171. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 502–04 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[W]hy should it matter, as far
as the Fifth Amendment is concerned, what inspired the taking in the first place?”).
172. 916 A.2d 324, 327–29 (Md. 2007).
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sided with the owner. 173 The court applied Kelo and reasoned that,
though the city had a renewal plan, the plan presented “sparse”
evidence that the taking was a public use: “It is virtually impossible to
determine the extent of the [public use] when no one knows the who,
what, and whether of the future use of the property.” 174 The court
explained that “[i]t is not enough . . . for the City to simply say that it
is conducting urban renewal and leave it at that,” instead, the
“government . . . must provide some assurance that the urban renewal
will constitute a public use or public purpose.” 175
In Rhode Island Economic Development Corp. v. Parking Co., a
private company and an airport attempted to renegotiate a deal that
permitted the private company to operate a parking garage near the
airport. 176 The negotiations stalled and, subsequently, the airport asked
the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation to condemn and
take a temporary easement in the garage. 177 The airport argued, in
part, for the bright-line rule that taking property that resulted in
government ownership was a public use. 178 But the court reasoned that
Kelo “stressed the condemning authority’s responsibility of good faith
and due diligence before it may start its condemnation engine.”179 The
court concluded that the “preparatory efforts” by the city in Kelo
“stand in stark contrast to [the airport’s] approach” in this case, which
demonstrates that the airport hastily tried to use eminent domain, after
stalled negotiations, to retaliate against the private company and gain
control of the parking garage at a discount price. 180 The court
emphasized that determining whether something is a public use “must
be decided on a case by case basis, ‘in light of the particular facts and
circumstances of that case.’”181
These two cases, and Kaur, show that Kelo majority’s approach
provides an effective tool for restraining the government’s eminent
domain power. By enabling courts to focus on the government’s
actions, not just on the outcome of the taking, courts may to consider
each taking—“in all fairness and justice”182— and on a case-by-case
173. Id. at 326–27.
174. Id. at 351, 353.
175. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
176. 892 A.2d 87, 91–93 (R.I. 2006).
177. Id. at 93.
178. Id. at 102.
179. Id. at 104.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 324 A.2d 641, 647 (R.I. 1974)).
182. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”).
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basis. On the other hand, Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Thomas’s
approaches may curb the court’s ability to prohibit takings that
involve, for example, bad faith, deficient planning, or unfair action by
the government.

B. Options for Improving Kelo’s Restraint on the Government’s
Eminent Domain Power
Despite the fact that Kelo may serve as a real restraint, the
majority opinion’s standard-based approach fails to provide the
predictability that a bright-line rule would provide. Improving how
well the government and affected parties can predict the validity of a
taking may encourage settlement, limit the number of contested
condemnation proceedings, and promote the government’s due
diligence. To remedy this lack of predictability in Kelo, state and local
governments 183 should consider enacting compensation and necessity
standards.
Enacting compensation standards may make takings more
predictable because these standards would compel the government to
consider carefully the taking before initiating condemnation
proceedings. While the Takings Clause’s just-compensation
requirement merely requires the government to pay market value for
the property, 184 new state and local compensation standards could
require the government to pay higher amounts of compensation
depending on factors such as the property’s use or how long the owner
has owned the property. These standards should provide some level of
predictability, enabling the government to know how much “just
compensation” it will have to pay before it initiates condemnation
proceedings. Thus, basic economics and the fear of paying too much
for a taking may force the government to find out how much it will
have to pay for the taking before initiating condemnation proceedings.
High prices may also create an incentive to consider other alternatives
to satisfy the government’s need. As a result, the government’s actions
are more likely to parallel the carefully considered plan in Kelo and,
consequently, the government will have a probable assurance that the
taking is valid before the government initiates condemnation

183. Justice Stevens, in a post-Kelo speech, “expressed the belief that the clamor ‘that
greeted Kelo is some evidence that the political process is up to the task of addressing’ eminent
domain issues.” Mahoney, supra note 70, at 125 (citing Justice John Paul Stevens, Judicial
Predilections, Address at the Clark County Bar Association (Aug. 18, 2005)). It is possible that
post-Kelo legislative action aimed at remedying flaws in Kelo “could recast the Court’s opinion
in Kelo as a prudent act of restraint that served as a catalyst for popular deliberation.” Id.
184. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1984).
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proceedings. 185
Another way state and local governments could increase
predictability is to enact necessity standards. “[N]ecessity . . . requires
that a condemnor justify a proposed taking as [reasonably] 186
necessary for furthering a proposed public use.” 187 Although
determining whether a taking is necessary is the legislature’s job, 188
courts may intervene and hold the legislature accountable if the
legislature enacts a necessity-standard statute.189
To illustrate, in Rawls v. Leon County, a Florida court
demonstrated that determining necessity is initially a legislative
function, but that when the law enables a landowner to challenge the
necessity of the taking, “the issue of necessity becomes ultimately a
judicial question” with the burden resting on the government.190 In
Florida, a “condemning authority must show a necessity for the taking
as a condition precedent to the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.” 191 This requirement corresponds with a Florida statute
stating, “[t]hose having the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain may file a petition” showing “that the property is necessary
for that public use.” 192
185. Cf. Fee, supra note 165, passim (proposing a compensation standard that accounts for
how long a homeowner has owned his home; thus, making the compensation requirement more
“just” because it accounts for the homeowner’s non-pecuniary losses such as sentimental value
and detachment from the community).
186. In eminent domain, the necessity doctrine does not require absolute necessity; it only
requires reasonable or rational necessity. Robert C. Bird & Lynda J. Oswald, Necessity as a
Check on State Eminent Domain Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 99, 99, 116 (2009); see Robert
C. Bird, Reviving Necessity in Eminent Domain, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 270–71
(2010) (equating necessity review with a less drastic means test that asks “whether the
condemnor’s purpose can be accomplished through less intrusive governmental means”). In
addition to increasing predictability under Kelo, necessity standards might also have other
advantages such as finding creative solutions to suit the condemnor’s needs and increasing
government accountability. See id. at 277–78.
187. Bird & Oswald, supra note 186, at 99.
188. Id. at 105–13; see R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 96 (R.I.
2006). Bird and Oswald also demonstrated that, while determining necessity was the legislature’s
job, determining public use was the court’s job. Bird & Oswald, supra note 186, at 105–113; see
generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 517–18 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that “[t]here is no justification . . . for affording almost insurmountable deference to
legislative conclusions that a use serves a ‘public use’”).
189. Bird & Oswald, supra note 186, at 111–12.
190. 974 So. 2d 543, 546–47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The court reasoned that in
evaluating necessity, courts should consider factors such as “cost, environmental factors, longrange area planning, safety considerations and the existence of alternative routes.” Id. at 547.
The court held that the county demonstrated a reasonable necessity for taking landowner’s
property. Id.
191. Id. at 546.
192. FLA. STAT. § 73.021 (2009); see Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Valsamaki,
916 A.2d 324, 328–29 (Md. 2007) (applying a Baltimore city code with similar language to
Florida’s statute to invalidate a taking). Arizona provides another example of a necessity
requirement. Arizona civil procedure requires that “before property may be taken, it shall appear
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Therefore, similar to how compensation standards may increase
predictability, enacting necessity standards may increase predictability
under Kelo. Because the government bears the burden of proof to
show necessity, the government will be forced to make some sort of
reviewable record that can sufficiently prove necessity before the
government initiates condemnation proceedings. As the court in Rhode
Island Economic Development Corp. v. The Parking Co. stated, “it is
not the function of [the courts] to dissect a legislative declaration to
glean a public purpose”; therefore, the government bears the burden
of doing its “due diligence before it may start its condemnation
engine.” 193 Thus, the government is more likely to develop a carefully
considered development plan or record, especially if a legislature
enacts specific necessity standards such as a requiring that a
condemnor justify taking the property in lieu of alternative options.
V. CONCLUSION

Kaur demonstrates that Kelo may effectively restrain the
government’s eminent domain power despite the popular belief that
Kelo eviscerates the public use requirement. By requiring that a record
must demonstrate a public purpose for the taking, Kelo provides
courts with an effective tool to prohibit unfair and unjust takings.
While this approach provides little predictability because courts will
evaluate takings on a case-by-case basis without a bright-line rule, it
may be advantageous to allow a court to review the government’s
actions that lead up to the taking instead of confining the court’s
review to the result of the taking. Plus, by collaborating legislatively
imposed compensation and necessity standards with the majority
opinion in Kelo, predictability may increase.
Even though the Kaur court provided a good example of how Kelo
could restrain eminent domain power, the Kaur court provided a bad
example of showing whether a private university is a public use.
Equating public use with whether the private university possesses
eminent domain power ignores other ways the legislature could
effectuate the belief that private universities are part of the education
ideal. Education is a public use, and that if the legislature has, through
any appropriate means, effectuated the belief that private universities
are part of this public use, then it is acceptable to use eminent domain
that: (1) The use to which the property is to be applied is a use authorized by law. (2) The
taking is necessary to such use. (3) If the property is already appropriated to some public use,
the public use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.” ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-1112 (2009).
193. 892 A.2d at 103–04; see supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
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to expand a private university.

Chad Olsen

J.D., April, 2010, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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APPENDIX: EXAMPLES OF LAWS RELEVANT TO DETERMINING IF THE
STATE LEGISLATURE BELIEVES PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES ARE A PUBLIC
USE

Arkansas
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-61-202(b) (2003) (illustrating how
Arkansas’s entire education code encourages private universities to
participate in carrying out the goal of “continued development of
Arkansas”: “The board shall encourage the cooperation of private
institutions of higher learning in its efforts to plan more effectively for
the coordinated development of higher education in this state”).

California
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94801(b) (West 2003) (showing that, in
addition to the legislature granting private universities eminent domain
power, see id. § 94500, “[p]rivate postsecondary schools can
complement the public education system and help develop a trained
workforce to meet the demands of California businesses and the
economy”).

Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT. §10a-6(b)(4) (2009) (stating that one of the
state’s higher education goals is “to assure the fullest possible use of
available resources in public and private institutions of higher
education”).

Florida

FLA. STAT. § 1005.01 (2009) (“The Legislature encourages
privately supported higher education and intends to aid in protecting
the health, education, and welfare of persons who receive educational
services from independent postsecondary educational institutions in
this state.”).

Georgia
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-202 to -203 (2009) (creating the Private
Colleges and Universities Authority, which performs both “an
essential governmental function” and “an essential public function” to
assist “institutions for higher education”).
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Idaho
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-128 (2008) (“The legislature finds that
there is a need for expanded educational experiences including a need
for additional positive science education experiences for the youth of
this state. The legislature finds that it is in the public interest to
encourage science education opportunities through cooperative efforts
with private nonprofit organizations.”).

Illinois
110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/3 (West 2009) (enabling
nonpublic institutions of higher learning to receive institutional grants
in an amount based on factors such as the number of enrolled
students).

Indiana

IND. CODE § 21-17-3-1 (2009) (“The general assembly recognizes
that the [higher education] private school is an essential part of the
educational system.” This chapter was created in part for the benefit
of “the general public.”).

Iowa

IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 261A.2–.4 (West 2003) (creating the Higher
Education Loan Authority for private institutions because “it is
essential that this and future generations . . . be given the fullest
opportunity to learn and to develop their intellectual . . . capacities,”
which, in turn, will benefit the people of Iowa, increase commerce,
enhance welfare, and improve living conditions).

Maryland
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 10-211(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (“The
nonpublic institutions of higher education in the State are an important
educational resource and are vital to the provision of postsecondary
education in the State.”).

Michigan

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.921a (West 1997) (stating that
“there exists in this state a need for the financing of educational
facilities at private or nonpublic, nonprofit institutions of higher
learning”; that “it is a valid public purpose to lend money to or
participate in the lending of money to these educational institutions for
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the acquisition or alteration of, or energy efficiency improvements to,
educational facilities within this state”; and that “the authority and
powers conferred by this act constitute a necessary program and serve
a valid public purpose”).

Minnesota
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 136A.61 (West 2008) (explaining that the
legislature enacted the Minnesota Private and Out-of-State Public
Postsecondary Education Act because “private not-for-profit and forprofit institutions of postsecondary education and the existence of
legitimate private colleges and universities are in the best interests of
the people of this state”).

Mississippi
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-104-3 (2007) (stating that the legislature
enacted the Mississippi Educational Facilities Authority Act for
Private, Nonprofit Institutions of Higher Learning because providing
private universities with the means to assist the people of the state is
essential to the state and is a public purpose).

Nebraska
NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-1702 (2008) (showing that “it is of the
utmost importance that private institutions of higher education . . . be
provided with . . . means of assisting . . . youth” because “it is
essential that . . . youth be given the greatest opportunity to learn”
and because it will benefit the people by increasing commerce and
welfare).

Nevada
NEV. REV. STAT. § 394.125 (2007) (“It is the policy of this State
to encourage and enable its residents to receive an education
commensurate with their respective talents and desires. The
Legislature recognizes that privately owned institutions offering
elementary, secondary and postsecondary education . . . perform a
necessary service to the residents of this State.”).
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New Hampshire
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 195-D:1, D:3 (2008) (enabling any
nonprofit postsecondary educational institution to participate with the
New Hampshire Health and Education Facilities Authority, whose
purpose is to increase the welfare of the people of the state by
ensuring that educational institutions have the means necessary to
educate youth).

New Jersey
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3B-2 (2010) (declaring that the legislature
believes institutions of higher education are valuable and that “the
State benefits from a coordinated system of higher education that
includes public and private institutions”).

New Mexico
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-23-2 (LexisNexis 2007) (showing that the
legislature created the Post-Secondary Educational Institution Act “to
improve the quality of private post-secondary education”).

New York
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6252 (McKinney 2010) (declaring the
legislature’s belief that “there is a serious need throughout the state
for adequate educational . . . facilities, the lack of which threatens and
adversely affects the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people,”
and that the legislature approves remedying this problem by
redeveloping areas reasonably accessible to “public and private
improvement
programs . . .
including
the
provision
of
educational . . . facilities, and the encouragement of participation in
these programs by private enterprise”).

North Carolina
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-201 (2009) (stating the legislature’s intent
for creating the State Education Assistance Authority was “to assist
qualified students to enable them to obtain an education beyond the
high school level by attending public or private educational
institutions” because “it is in the public interest and essential to the
welfare and well-being of the State . . . to foster and provide financial
assistance to properly qualified students in order to help them to
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obtain an education beyond the high school level”).

North Dakota
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-10.1-01 (2003) (“To make the most
provident utilization of state institutions of higher education and
private colleges . . . it is desirable to provide means which will enable
a student . . . to obtain desired courses in the most expedient manner
and at the least possible cost.”).

Ohio
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3377.01, .02 (2004) (creating the Ohio
Higher Educational Facility Commission to enhance educational
opportunities and facilities in non-profit educational institutions,
“thereby promoting the employment opportunities, economic welfare,
public health and general welfare of the people”).

Oklahoma
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 2631 (West 2005) (creating the
Oklahoma Tuition Equalization Grant Program “to maximize use of
existing educational resources and facilities within this state, both
public and private” by awarding grants to residents enrolled in private
or independent institutions of higher education).

Oregon
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 351.001, .003 (2009) (stating that to
encourage political, economic, and cultural well-being, “Oregonians
need access to post-secondary education opportunities throughout life
in a variety of forms,” and that these “educational needs will be best
met in an environment in which public and independent schools are
recognized as critical for meeting those needs”).

Pennsylvania
24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6901.501-.503, (2006) (approving
college savings bonds to enhance the welfare of the people by
enhancing educational opportunities through “[a]ll public and private
colleges and universities located within this Commonwealth”).
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Rhode Island
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-57-2 (2001) (authorizing a system of
financial assistance to enable qualified students to attend “public or
private educational institutions” because enabling students to attend
higher education institutions and appropriating funds to higher
education institutions serve a public purpose).

South Carolina
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-109-20 (2004) (declaring that the legislature
enacted the Educational Facilities Authority Act for Private Nonprofit
Institutions of Higher Learning because it is the policy of the state to
enhance the welfare of the people through assisting essential
institutions of higher education).

South Dakota
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 13-55A-1, 13-55B-3 (2004) (showing
that giving financial aid and tuition equalization grants to students that
attend “public and private nonprofit and proprietary institutions,
including four-year colleges and universities,” is in the public
interest).

Tennessee
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-802, -803 (2009) (establishing a
higher education trust program for the advancement and improvement
of higher education, including private universities, because higher
education in this state is an essential governmental function and
purpose of this state).

Texas
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.6001 (Vernon 2006) (stating that it
is an urgent public necessity to assist young Texans in receiving a
higher education through public or private facilities, and that it is
important “to preserve the partnership between the state and private or
independent institutions of higher education”).
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Virginia
VA. CODE ANN. § 23-30.39 (2006) (enacting the Educational
Facilities Authority Act to assist higher educational institutions,
including private institutions, in providing the facilities needed to
educate the public, which the legislature believes is essential to the
welfare of the people).

Washington
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.07.010 (West 2009) (“Adequate
educational opportunities are essential to the . . . well-being of the
state . . . . Washington’s . . . private nonprofit higher education
institutions are a necessary part of the state’s higher educational
resources. They provide educational diversity and choice for all
residents of the communities in which they are located . . . .”).

West Virginia
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18B-1-1a, -1-2 (LexisNexis 2009) (giving
the legislature’s findings concerning public and other post-secondary
higher education institutions, including nonprofit institutions: “postsecondary education is vital to the future of West Virginia” and
“providing access to a high-quality and affordable post-secondary
education is a state responsibility”).

